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ENFORCING RIGHTS: A CASE FOR
PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION UNDER
SECTION 253 OF THE FEDERAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
JAMES E. LIPPERT†
INTRODUCTION
When entering a new market, telecommunications
companies spend millions of dollars investing in infrastructure
and related market-entry costs.1 Sometimes these companies
utilize city-owned rights-of-way in order to provide their
services.2
Although
section
253
of
the
Federal
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“FTA”) allows state or local
governments to manage or seek compensation for the use of
rights-of-way, they may not do so in a discriminatory or
unreasonable manner.3 Yet the power of the federal government
to enforce these terms is in doubt.4 Also, section 253 does not
explicitly grant telecommunications companies a right to sue in
federal court.5 Therefore, after investing millions of dollars,
telecommunications providers can be essentially held hostage by
state and local governments. Such “hold-ups” will cause fewer
companies to invest in telecommunications services, which in
turn, means higher prices and lower quality services for the

†
Research Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2010, St. John’s
University School of Law; B.A., 2007, Binghamton University.
1
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 76, Cablevision of Boston, Inc. v. Pub.
Improvement Comm’n of Boston, 184 F.3d 88 (1st Cir. 1999) (No. 99-1222).
2
See, e.g., Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258, 1262 (10th Cir. 2004).
3
See 47 U.S.C. § 253(c) (2006).
4
See BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169, 1190–
91 (11th Cir. 2001).
5
See 47 U.S.C. § 253(d).
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millions of people who rely on their services.6 Thus, it is
essential
for
the
functioning
of
our
society
that
telecommunications providers have a right to sue in federal
court.
Section 253 of the FTA prohibits any state or local
government from interfering with a telecommunications
provider’s ability to provide service, unless the state’s regulation
falls within one of the two safe harbor provisions.7 The first safe
harbor provision allows state and local governments to “regulate
telecommunications in the public interest, as long as such
regulations are competitively neutral.”8 The second safe harbor
provision allows state and local “regulations relating to right-ofway management and compensation which are competitively
neutral and nondiscriminatory.”9 The FTA explicitly grants the
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) enforcement
power over most of section 253.10 Yet the FCC is not explicitly
granted authority to enforce the second safe harbor provision.11
As a result, the burden of enforcement rests with the
telecommunications providers. Thus, in order to enforce these
laws, telecommunications providers must have a private right of
action.
Two private rights of action are available to
telecommunications providers seeking to enforce section 253:
(1) an implied cause of action or (2) a section 1983 claim.12 The
result of a successful claim based on either theory is the same:
the court creates a private right of action even though the statute
did not expressly authorize a private suit.13 There are, however,
differences between the two claims. For example, section 1983 is

6
See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, Preamble, 110 Stat.
56, 56 (stating that increased competition and decreased regulation will result in
lower prices and higher quality services).
7
See 47 U.S.C. § 253(a)–(c).
8
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Utah, 216 F.3d 929, 939 n.6
(10th Cir. 2000).
9
Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258, 1272 (10th Cir. 2004).
10
See 47 U.S.C. § 253(d).
11
See id. § 253(c)–(d).
12
See Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the
Existence of Implied Private Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861, 872 n.64
(1996).
13
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); Stabile, supra note 12, at 861.
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statutorily based,14 while an implied cause of action derives from
the common law.15 More importantly, however, the standard of
proof traditionally required under a section 1983 claim “is far
less stringent than what is required to establish an implied
[cause] of action.”16
Yet the recent case of Gonzaga University v. Doe17 has led
some courts to believe that a private right of action is not
available under any provision of section 253.18 In part, this view
stems from the mistaken belief that there are no longer
significant differences between an implied cause of action and a
section 1983 claim.19 Moreover, some argue that the Gonzaga
decision has created an entirely new, and more stringent,
Relying on such
standard for private rights of action.20
arguments,
some
courts
have
mistakenly
denied
telecommunications providers a private right of action under
section 253.21 This approach, however, misinterprets Gonzaga.
Part I of this Note provides background on the meaning of section
253 and the current law regarding private rights of action. It
also briefly discusses the unique problems presented for private
rights of action where the underlying legislation is passed
pursuant to the Spending Clause—which was at issue in
Gonzaga. Part II discusses whether the circuit courts allow
telecommunications providers a private right of action under
section 253. Some pre-Gonzaga courts granted a private right of
action for telecommunications providers when a state or local
government exceeded its safe harbor to manage a public right-ofway under section 253(c). These courts held that, under the
traditional standard for implied causes of action, the text and
structure of section 253 and its legislative history, in addition to

14

See Sasha Samberg-Champion, How To Read Gonzaga: Laying the Seeds of a
Coherent Section 1983 Jurisprudence, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1838, 1841–42 (2003).
15
See Stabile, supra note 12, at 864.
16
Furtick v. Medford Hous. Auth., 963 F. Supp. 64, 71 n.18 (D. Mass. 1997).
17
536 U.S. 273 (2002).
18
See, e.g., Sw. Bell Tel., LP v. City of Houston, 529 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir.
2008).
19
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Limiting Suits To Enforce Federal Laws, 39 SUP. CT.
REV. 70, 71 (2003).
20
See id.
21
See, e.g., Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258, 1266–67 (10th Cir.
2004).
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the purpose of the FTA as a whole and other analogous sections
of the FTA, indicates the availability of an implied cause of
action. For all that, many post-Gonzaga courts have denied a
private right of action under any subsection of section 253. These
courts held that the Gonzaga decision was controlling and, in
light of that decision, the telecommunications providers’ claims
must fail. Part III argues that telecommunications providers
should have a private right of action where a state or local
government exceeds its safe harbor under section 253(c), which
allows for the management of a public right-of-way.22 First, it
argues that the Gonzaga decision only controls where the
underlying statute was passed pursuant to the Spending Clause.
Since the FTA was passed pursuant to the Interstate Commerce
Clause, the Gonzaga decision is not controlling. Next, Part III
argues that, properly limited, the Gonzaga decision allows a
private right of action under section 253 for telecommunication
providers.
In doing so, this Part concludes that a
telecommunications provider has an implied cause of action
under section 253(c). Moreover, since the telecommunications
provider succeeds on the more difficult implied cause of action
claim, then courts should also allow the telecommunications
providers to prevail on the easier claim to prove—a section 1983
claim. Finally, this Part concludes that there are significant
policy reasons favoring a private right of action under section
253(c) of the FTA.
I.

NEITHER THE LAW REGARDING PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION
NOR SECTION 253 IS SETTLED

The history of section 1983 and implied causes of action is
both independent and intertwined,23 which has created confusion
22
For example, one way a state or local government may exceed its safe-harbor
is when a state or local government charges discriminatory or unreasonable rates
against a telecommunications provider under the guise of managing a public rightof-way. See, e.g., TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2000).
23
Compare Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283–85 (2002) (arguing that
implied causes of action and section 1983 claims involve the same initial inquiry),
and Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (judging an implied cause of action claim by
looking to whether the statute was passed to protect the plaintiff by creating a
remedy for a violation of the statutory right that is consistent with the statute and
whether there was an obligation on the state), with Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S.
329, 329–30 (1997) (judging a section 1983 claim by asking whether the plaintiff was
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in the courts. Similarly, the courts criticized section 253 as the
product of poor legislative drafting.24 As a result, there is
confusion and disagreement among both federal circuit and
district courts as to the meaning of section 253.25 Since private
rights of action and section 253 claims are difficult to understand
on their own, there is immense confusion when they interact.26
A.

Confused Courts and Section 253 of the Federal
Telecommunications Act of 1996

In passing the FTA as a whole, Congress sought to advance
two objectives.27 First, Congress wanted to “end the monopolies
in local telephone services . . . by fostering competition between
telephone companies.”28 Second, Congress hoped “to benefit
consumers by fostering competition between telephone
companies in cities throughout the United States.”29 Therefore,
Congress thought that by decreasing regulation, the resulting
competition would spur innovation and reduce the cost, as well as

an intended recipient of a right, and whether there was an obligation on the state),
and Samberg-Champion, supra note 14, at 1870–73 (arguing that section 1983 and
implied causes of action are, and always have been, judged differently by the courts).
24
Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. City of Greensboro, 440 F. Supp. 2d 480, 488
(M.D.N.C. 2006) (“To be sure, the structure of section 253 is confusing, and courts
have struggled with its interpretation.”); Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. City of Berkeley,
202 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (“[I]t is worth noting that § 253 is not a
model of clarity. Courts that have sought to interpret the section have noted the
questions raised by its wording and structure.”).
25
See City of Greensboro, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 488.
26
Compare, e.g., TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 624 (holding that a private right of
action lies under section 253), with City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d at 1266–67 (holding
that a section 1983 claim does not lie under section 253).
27
Cf. John Paul Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140
U. PA. L. REV. 1373, 1376 (1992) (stating that, when employing statutory
interpretation, it is important to “[r]ead the entire statute”).
28
AT&T Commc’ns of the Sw., Inc. v. City of Dallas, 8 F. Supp. 2d 582, 585
(N.D. Tex. 1998); see Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
Preamble, 110 Stat. 56, 56. Prior to the FTA, telecommunications services were
provided by state-sponsored monopolies with legislative bars to market entry. See
AT&T, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 586. Thus, the purpose of the act was to allow new
telecommunications carriers entry into the market. See id.; see also City of
Greensboro, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 487 (“Thus, in passing the FTA, Congress intended
that market competition, rather than state or local regulations, would primarily
determine which companies would provide the telecommunications services
demanded by consumers.”).
29
AT&T, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 585.
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services.30

The courts have formed two distinct interpretations of
section 253 of the FTA: (1) the “deliberate omission”
interpretation; and (2) the “overriding purpose” interpretation.31
The courts that follow the “deliberate omission” interpretation
believe that Congress intended to allow for a private right of
action under 253(c)—the safe harbor which gives the state the

30

Telecommunications Act of 1996 Preamble.
Section 253 entitled “Removal of Barriers to Entry” provides in part the
following:
(a) In general
No State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal
requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of
any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications
service.
(b) State regulatory authority
Nothing in this section shall affect the ability of a State to impose, on a
competitively neutral basis and consistent with section 254 of this title,
requirements necessary to preserve and advance universal service, protect
the public safety and welfare, ensure the continued quality of
telecommunications services, and safeguard the rights of consumers.
(c) State and local government authority
Nothing in this section affects the authority of a State or local government
to manage the public rights-of-way or to require fair and reasonable
compensation from telecommunications providers, on a competitively
neutral and nondiscriminatory basis, for use of public rights-of-way on a
nondiscriminatory basis, for use of public rights-of-way on a
nondiscriminatory basis, if the compensation required is publicly disclosed
by such government.
(d) Preemption
If, after notice and an opportunity for public comment, the Commission
determines that a State or local government has permitted or imposed any
statute, regulation, or legal requirement that violates subsection (a) or (b)
of this section, the Commission shall preempt the enforcement of such
statute, regulation, or legal requirement to the extent necessary to correct
such violation or inconsistency.
47 U.S.C. § 253(a)–(d) (2006). The reason the courts have interpreted the section
differently is due in part to the fact that section 253 is not a “model of clarity.” Qwest
Commc’ns Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 202 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2001). In
fact, this confusion caused the FCC to offer its own interpretation of section 253. See
generally FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, FCC NO. 98-295, SUGGESTED
GUIDELINES FOR PETITIONS FOR RULING UNDER SECTION 253 OF THE
COMMUNICATIONS ACT (1998), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_
Carrier/Public_Notices/1998 (scroll down and click on fcc98295.wp or fcc98295.txt)
[hereinafter FCC NOTICE].
31
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power to manage public rights-of-way.32
They base their
understanding of the statute in subsection (d), which is the
“enforcement provision” of the statute.33 That provision explicitly
gives the FCC enforcement power over the general prohibition in
subsection (a) and the safe harbor for regulation in the public
interest found in subsection (b).34 Yet subsection (c) was not
included in the text of subsection (d); thus, the FCC does not
have enforcement power when a state exceeds its safe harbor to
manage public rights-of-way.35 Therefore, a private right of
action is necessary to enforce subsection (c).36
Although “deliberate omission” theorists ultimately base
their conclusion in subsection (d), they start with the general
prohibition found in subsection (a).37 Subsection (a) is a general
proscription against interference with telecommunication
services by state or local governments.38 To this end, the
“deliberate omission” followers believe that subsection (a)
provides substantive limits “on the authority of state and local
governments to regulate telecommunications.”39
That is,
subsection (a) functions as a limitation on the power of any state
to pass any law that interferes with telecommunication services.
Yet the other subsections of section 253 provide safe harbors
from the general prohibition found in subsection (a),40 as these
subsections “are couched not in terms of limitation, but of
exception to the general rule set forth in (a).”41 For instance,
subsection (b) allows state and local governments to “regulate
telecommunications in the public interest, as long as such
regulations are competitively neutral.”42
Furthermore,

32
See, e.g., BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169,
1187–88 (11th Cir. 2001).
33
See id. at 1189.
34
47 U.S.C. § 253(d); see BellSouth Telecomms., 252 F.3d at 1189.
35
47 U.S.C. § 253(d); see BellSouth Telecomms., 252 F.3d at 1189.
36
See, e.g., BellSouth Telecomms., 252 F.3d at 1191.
37
See id. at 1186; see also Stevens, supra note 27, at 1374 (“[W]hen federal
judges are required to interpret acts of Congress, they must begin by reading the
text of the statute.”).
38
See 47 U.S.C. § 253(a).
39
BellSouth Telecomms., 252 F.3d at 1186.
40
See id. at 1186–87.
41
See id. at 1187.
42
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Utah, 216 F.3d 929, 939 n.6
(10th Cir. 2000). For example, a state will violate subsection (a) if it charges a
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subsection (c) allows state and local “regulations relating to
right-of-way management and compensation which are
competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory.”43 Thus, these two
subsections operate as exceptions to the general prohibition
found in subsection (a).
Finally, “deliberate subscribers” reach subsection (d). This
subsection is the “enforcement provision” of section 253, and
provides that if “a State or local government has permitted or
imposed any statute, regulation, or legal requirement that
violates subsection (a) or (b) . . . the Commission shall preempt
the enforcement of such statute, regulation or legal
requirement . . . to correct such violation or inconsistency.”44 In
light of this language, “deliberate omission” subscribers conclude
that the FCC has enforcement authority over subsections (a) and
(b).45 As such, the FCC can enforce the general requirement that
a state not interfere with telecommunications, and determine if
the state action is within the safe harbor for nondiscriminatory
regulation in the public’s interest. For all that, any reference to
subsection (c) is notably absent from this provision.46 Therefore,
these courts conclude that this is a deliberate omission, and that
the FCC does not have enforcement power over “regulations
relating to right-of-way management and compensation which
are competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory.”47 As a result,
the only way to enforce the limits of this safe harbor is through a
private right of action.
The “deliberate omission” theorists also find support for their
interpretation in other sections of the FTA.48 Specifically, these
courts look to section 255, which explicitly prohibits a private
telecommunication provider money to lay wires inside its state. Subsection (c),
however, provides the state with an affirmative defense. That is, although
subsection (a) is violated by this conduct, a state can argue that subsection (c) allows
for such fees. Likewise, if a state requires that the company only lay wire that meet
certain safety specifications, that would violate subsection (a). Yet the state could
assert an affirmative defense that this conduct is allowed under subsection (b). Thus
subsection (a) provides substantive limits, and subsection (b) and (c) provide
affirmative defenses to a violation of subsection (a).
43
Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258, 1272 (10th Cir. 2004).
44
47 U.S.C. § 253(d) (2006).
45
See BellSouth Telecomms., 252 F.3d at 1189–91.
46
See id. at 1191.
47
City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d at 1272.
48
See Stevens, supra note 27, at 1376 (“ ‘Read the entire statute.’ ”).
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right of action.49 Since the FTA explicitly grants a private right
of action in some sections of the FTA, sound statutory analysis
dictates that silence in other sections should be interpreted as an
implicit grant of a private right of action in that subsection.50
Since there is no explicit prohibitory language in section 253, a
private right of action is implied.
The second approach to section 253 is the “overriding
purpose” view.51 As in any sound statutory interpretation,
“overriding purpose” theorists start at the beginning of the
section.52 They first decide whether a state action “falls within
the proscription of section 253(a).”53 That is, whether the
state or local government has illegally interfered with
telecommunications services.54 Next, the “overriding purpose”
subscribers argue that certain state actions are allowed under
subsections (b) and (c), even though they are prohibited by
subsection (a).55 For example, although managing a public rightof-way is prohibited under subsection (a), it is explicitly allowed
under subsection (c).56 Thus, “overriding purpose” subscribers,
much like “deliberate omission” subscribers, recognize a safe
harbor provision within the statute.57 Still, the two schools of
thought differ with regard to subsection (d).
“Deliberate
omission” theorists argue that if Congress wanted to grant the
FCC enforcement power over subsection (c), that subsection
would have been listed within subsection (d).58 “Overriding

49
47 U.S.C. § 255(f) (2006) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to
authorize any private right of action to enforce any requirement of this section or
any regulation thereunder. The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction with
respect to any complaint under this section.”).
50
See TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2000).
51
See Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. City of Greensboro, 440 F. Supp. 2d 480, 489–90
(M.D.N.C. 2006).
52
See Stevens, supra note 27, at 1374 (stating that it is important to “ ‘read the
statute’ ”).
53
See City of Greensboro, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 488 (quoting FCC NOTICE, supra
note 31).
54
See 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2006).
55
See FCC NOTICE, supra note 31.
56
Compare 47 U.S.C. § 253(a), with 47 U.S.C. § 253(c).
57
Compare, e.g., City of Greensboro, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 488 (finding a “ ‘safe
harbor’ ”), with BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169,
1187 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding a “ ‘safe harbor[ ]’ ”).
58
See Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258, 1265–66 (10th Cir. 2004);
BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 252 F.3d at 1189, 1191.
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purpose” advocates, however, argue that the FCC must have
enforcement power over all subsections of 253 in order to fulfill
the FTA’s overriding purpose, which is to “regulate interstate
and foreign commerce and provide safe and efficient services, to
be executed and enforced by the FCC.”59 Therefore, Congress
must have intended for the FCC to have enforcement power over
subsection (c), even though it is not explicitly conferred.60
Moreover, these “overriding purpose” subscribers believe
that the FTA is always explicit when it grants a private right of
action. For example, sections 252,61 258,62 and 27463 of the FTA
all explicitly provide for a private right of action to enforce their
mandates.64 This is important because the FTA’s explicitness in
59

City of Greensboro, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 490 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006)).
Such subscribers find further support for their theory in another section of the FTA.
Specifically, section 257(a), which provides:
Within 15 months after February 8, 1996, the Commission shall complete a
proceeding for the purpose of identifying and eliminating, by regulations
pursuant to its authority under this chapter (other than this section),
market entry barriers for entrepreneurs and other small businesses in the
provision and ownership of telecommunications services and information
services, or in the provision of parts or services to providers of
telecommunications services and information services.
47 U.S.C. § 257(a) (2006).
60
City of Greensboro, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 490. Although such an interpretation
seems to rebut sound statutory analysis, see Stevens, supra note 27, at 1374, some
courts have held that this is not the case where the plain meaning of a statute “will
produce a result ‘demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters.’ ” Clark v.
Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2006).
61
47 U.S.C. § 252 (2006).
62
Id. § 258.
63
Id. § 274.
64
See Cablevision of Boston, Inc. v. Pub. Improvement Comm’n of Boston, 184
F.3d 88, 107–08 (1st Cir. 1999) (Noonan, J., concurring). Section 252(e)(6), for
example, governs agreements between telecommunications carriers and the states,
and a state’s ability to accept or reject such agreements. See 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6).
There, the FTA specifically provides that: “In a case in which a State . . . makes a
determination under this section, any party aggrieved by such determination may
bring an action in an appropriate Federal district court . . . .” Id. Likewise, Congress
was explicit in creating a private right of action in section 258(b). See Cablevision,
184 F.3d at 107. If a carrier violated the procedures of the FCC under section 258,
the statute specifically provides that the carrier is not shielded from “any other
remedies available at law.” 47 U.S.C. § 258(b). In other words, the aggrieved party
may sue under other theories of law—for example, fraud or misrepresentation. Cf.
Valdes v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 116, 121–22, 123–25 (D. Conn.
2001) (finding that the plaintiffs could pursue a private right of action claim under
section 258 for slamming, which is similar to, but not preemptive of, common law
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granting a private right of action in other sections of the FTA
indicates that silence in section 253 should be interpreted as
denying a private right of action.65 Therefore, these courts
believe that section 253 does not allow for a private right of
action.
B.

A Confusing Clarification of Implied Causes of Action

In recent years, the Supreme Court, despite its attempt to
clarify the law,66 has created great confusion with regards to
private rights of action. Traditionally, the courts looked to Cort
v. Ash67 and its progeny to judge the existence of an implied
cause of action.68 The Cort decision analyzed four factors to
determine if an implied cause of action existed69: (1) “[I]s the
plaintiff ‘one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted[?]’ ”70 (2) “[I]s there any indication of legislative
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to
deny one?”71 (3) “[I]s it consistent with the underlying purposes

fraud or fraudulent misrepresentation). Similarly, section 274(e) is also explicit
when creating a private right of action. See Cablevision, 184 F.3d at 107 (Noonan, J.,
concurring). That section, essentially limiting the ability of carriers to engage in
electronic publishing, specifically provides that “[a]ny person” can bring a private
right of action under the FTA. 47 U.S.C. §§ 207, 274(e). Conversely, however, some
sections of the FTA are explicit when a private right of action should not be granted.
See TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2000).
65
See City of Greensboro, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 490.
66
See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 278 (2002). It is worth noting,
however, that during the early years of the country, the courts were very
sympathetic to a plaintiff’s injury. See Stabile, supra note 12, at 864. That is, the
theory was that “an individual is entitled to an adequate remedy for any legal wrong
.” Id. This was true “whether [it was a] common law wrong or statutory wrong.”
Id. For these early American courts, it did not matter whether Congress had
intended a remedy. Id.
67
422 U.S. 66 (1975).
68
See, e.g., TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 623; see also, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Suing
Under § 1983: The Future After Gonzaga University v. Doe, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1417,
1424 (2003); Stabile, supra note 12, at 866–67.
69
See, e.g., Stabile, supra note 12, at 867.
70
Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (quoting Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39
(1916) (asking, in other words, “does the statute create a federal right in favor of the
plaintiff?”)).
71
Id. Unlike the first factor, however, whose origin can be traced back to 1916,
this second prong appeared to be relatively new factor. Compare Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co.,
241 U.S. at 33 (decided in 1916), with Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of
R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974). In fact, as early as 1803, congressional
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of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff?”72
(4) “[I]s the cause of action one traditionally
relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the
States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action
based solely on federal law?”73 Notably, in Cort, only two of the
four factors focused on legislative intent,74 and those two factors
were not outcome determinative.75 Therefore, the Cort factors
were neither designed, nor originally interpreted, to be applied
rigidly.76 Rather, they were designed to be flexible.77 As such,
courts were free to balance a deficiency with one factor against
the oversatisfaction of another.78 But soon thereafter, the factors
were applied more rigidly by the Court, focusing mainly on
legislative intent—factors (1) and (2).79 This was done because
the courts thought the flexible standard permitted too many
private rights of action.80 Some members of the Court felt that
this lax standard caused an explosion of litigation in the federal
courts.81 Thus, these justices thought that more rigid standards
would reduce the number of federal suits.82 Despite these
alterations, Cort was still the controlling decision for an implied
cause of action, only with greater emphasis given to
congressional intent.83
Then the Supreme Court attempted to clarify implied cause
of action jurisprudence in Gonzaga University v. Doe.84 In that
case, the Court had to determine if a statute, enacted pursuant to
the Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution, conferred a remedy
intent was of little or no value to courts in deciding private rights of action. See
Stabile, supra note 12, at 864.
72
Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
73
Id.
74
See Stabile, supra note 12, at 867–68.
75
See id. at 868.
76
See id.
77
See id.
78
See id. at 868 & n.41 (noting that originally, the factors were applied flexibly).
79
See id. at 868; see also BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252
F.3d 1169, 1189 (11th Cir. 2001); TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618,
623–24 (6th Cir. 2000).
80
Samberg-Champion, supra note 14, at 1867.
81
See id.
82
See id.
83
See BellSouth Telecomms., 252 F.3d at 1189; TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 623–24.
84
536 U.S. 273, 278 (2002) (finding that the Court’s decisions have not been
“models of clarity”).
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available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.85 At first, the Court recognized
that a section 1983 claim and an implied cause of action claim
involve different inquires.86 According to the Court, however,
both claims begin with the same inquiry: “whether Congress
intended to create a federal right.”87 To make such a finding,
there must be “clear and unambiguous . . . rights-creating
language.”88 Moreover, this “rights-creating language” must
“confer individual rights upon a class of beneficiaries.”89 But
after an intention to create a federal right is demonstrated, the
Court recognized that the necessary inquiries for the two private
rights of action diverge.90
After a section 1983 plaintiff
establishes congressional intent to create a federal right, the
plaintiff is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that the right is
enforceable.91 Conversely, an implied cause of action plaintiff has
the burden of showing that “the statute manifests an intent ‘to
create not just a private right but also a private remedy.’ ”92
Although the Court never explicitly overruled Cort in its opinion,
there is no doubt that Gonzaga overruled Cort where the
underlying legislation was passed pursuant to the Spending

85
Id. at 276. Although Gonzaga involved a section 1983 claim, discussed infra,
the Court felt the need to address implied causes of action too. Id. at 283 (rejecting
“the notion that our implied right of action cases are separate and distinct from our
§ 1983 cases”).
86
See id. at 283.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 290.
89
See id. at 285.
90
Id. at 284–85.
91
See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
92
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284 (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286
(2001)). Admittedly, this concept is difficult to understand, but it again focuses on
congressional intent. See Sital Kalantry, The Intent-to-Benefit: Individually
Enforceable Rights Under International Treaties, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 63, 70 (2008).
That is, although there is congressional intent to create an individual right, there is
no intent to give the plaintiff the power to enforce that right. See id. Normally, in
these instances, enforcement power is given to a regulatory agency. See, e.g., Wright
v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 426 (1987). Yet where there
is no agency or the agency cannot effectively enforce the act, the Court will find that
Congress must have intended to create a private remedy. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at
280 (citing Wright, 479 U.S. at 426). But a plaintiff who brings a section 1983 claim
does not need to go this extra step because “§ 1983 generally supplies a remedy for
the vindication of rights secured by federal statutes.” Id. at 284.
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Clause.93 Because of the Court’s focus on the Spending Clause,
however, it is unclear if the decision is controlling where the
underlying legislation was not passed pursuant to the Spending
Clause. Yet it makes sense to limit the Gonzaga decision to cases
involving the Spending Clause because of the unique problems
presented by Spending Clause legislation.
C.

A Confusing Clarification of Section 1983 Claims

Section 1983 and implied causes of action have similar
histories.94 As a result, the standard for determining a section
1983 claim was similar to the pre-Gonzaga Cort factors.95 Still,
the consensus among the courts was that if a plaintiff could show
an implied cause of action, then the plaintiff could show a section
1983 claim, as the section 1983 standard was less stringent.96
Traditionally, there were three principle factors in determining if
a section 1983 remedy was available under a statutory
provision97: (1) whether “Congress . . . intended that the provision
in question benefit the plaintiff,”98 (2) whether “the plaintiff[’s]
[asserted interests are] not so ‘vague and amorphous’ that its
enforcement would strain judicial competence,”99 and (3) whether
the statute “impose[s] a binding obligation on the States.”100 This
three-factor analysis, however, did not end the inquiry—it only
established a right and a “rebuttable presumption that [it was]

93

See infra Parts I.C and III. Yet some scholars, judges, and members of the
Court argue that Cort had already been overruled. See Samberg-Champion, supra
note 14, at 1870–71 (citing Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Franklin v.
Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 77 (1992), as affirmative evidence that the
Court had already overruled Cort. But see TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d
618, 624 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[A] majority of the Court has not gone so far as to hold that
Cort v. Ash has been ‘effectively overruled.’ ” (quoting Thompson v. Thompson, 484
U.S. 174, 188 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring))).
94
See supra note 23.
95
See infra notes 104–06 and accompanying text.
96
Furtick v. Medford Hous. Auth., 963 F. Supp. 64, 71 n.18 (D. Mass. 1997)
(“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff may enforce a statute against
state and local officials via section 1983 . . . is far less stringent than what is
required to establish an implied private right of action.”).
97
See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997).
98
Id.
99
Id. at 340–41.
100
Id. at 341.
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enforceable under § 1983.”101 This presumption was rebutted, for
example, if Congress explicitly or impliedly foreclosed a section
1983 remedy.102 That is, Congress could explicitly allow for a
private right of action, or, in the absence of an explicit statement,
it could be so clear from the text of the statute that a private
right of action is necessary to enforce the provision. Therefore,
despite this subtle difference, the law regarding section 1983
claims was similar to implied causes of action.
But the Gonzaga Court changed this standard—at least with
regards to statutes passed under the Spending Clause.103 Thus,
the new standard for section 1983 claims is similar to the test for
implied causes of action.104 First, the court must find evidence of
“an unambiguously conferred right,”105 directed “upon a class of
beneficiaries.”106 The plaintiff, however, is still presumed to have
a remedy after the right is established;107 this presumption is still
rebutted “by showing that Congress ‘specifically foreclosed a
remedy under [section] 1983.’ ”108 For example, if there is a
comprehensive enforcement scheme in the statute, this is
evidence of an implied foreclosure of a private remedy. Thus, the
Gonzaga decision altered the standard by which section 1983
claims are measured, much like the Court altered the implied
cause of action standard. Nevertheless, because of the Court’s
obvious concerns with Spending Clause legislation, it is unclear
whether this reasoning extends to cases where the underlying
legislation is not passed pursuant to the Spending Clause.
D. The Contractual Analogy of the Spending Clause
The Court is skeptical about inferring a private right of
action where the legislation was passed pursuant to the
Spending Clause because it would force the states to abide by
conditions that they did not consider when accepting the federal

101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

Id.
Id.
See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002).
See id.
See id.
Id. at 285.
See id. at 284.
See id. at 284 n.4 (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1005 n.9 (1984)).
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funds.109 That is, unlike most federal legislation, the states are
under no obligation to comply with legislation passed pursuant to
Congress’s power to spend.110 Therefore, the federal government
attempts to entice compliance by offering them federal funds.111
In exchange for the federal funds, however, the state must agree
to implement or comply with the federal legislation.112
Accordingly, the Court analogized Spending Clause legislation to
a contract between the states and the federal government.113 As
such, the Court attempts to remain consistent with contractual
For example, when interpreting the legislation
theory.114
between the state and the federal government, the Court always
tries to preserve the reasonable expectations of the parties.115 As
such, the Court has held that if Congress attaches conditions to
the conferral of money, “it must do so in clear and unambiguous
terms.”116 Therefore, when a court reads a private right of action
into Spending Clause legislation, it is adding terms to the
contract, thereby altering the reasonable expectations of the
parties.117
In keeping with the contractual analogy, the claimants in a
private right of action are considered third-party beneficiaries
under a contract.118 Third-party beneficiaries are parties that are
related to a contract, but not one of the parties to the contract.119
Thus, not all third-party beneficiaries have an enforceable right
under the contract.120 Rather, the third-party beneficiary must

109

See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
See Fermeen Fazal, Is Actual Notice an Actual Remedy? A Critique of Gebser
v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1033, 1077 (1999)
(stating that Spending Clause legislation is voluntary).
111
See West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 286
(4th Cir. 2002).
112
See id.
113
See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17.
114
See id.
115
Stabile, supra note 12, at 908.
116
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290 (2002).
117
Cf. Stabile, supra note 12, at 908 (stating that courts should consider the
reasonable expectations of the parties when deciding whether to grant an implied
cause of action).
118
See Samberg-Champion, supra note 14, at 1852.
119
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRACTS 880–81 (7th ed. 2008).
120
See id. at 881.
110
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demonstrate a legally protected interest in the contract to have
an enforceable right.121
A private right of action claimant is not a party to the
contract between the state and federal government. Instead, the
claimant enjoys a relationship similar to that of a third-party
beneficiary. Thus, if the claimant wants to affect the terms of the
contract between the state and the federal government by
inferring a private right of action, the court has to determine
whether that third-party beneficiary should have a legally
protected interest in the contract.122
Consequently, one
interpretation of Gonzaga is that it determines whether a
plaintiff seeking a private right of action has a legally protected
interest in the contract between the state and federal
government.123 Yet such an interpretation would limit the reach
of the Gonzaga decision to private rights of action involving the
Spending Clause, as outside of that context there is no need for
contractual analogy, or to determine if a plaintiff is a third-party
beneficiary.
II. WHETHER A PLAINTIFF CAN BRING AN IMPLIED CAUSE OF
ACTION OR A SECTION 1983 CLAIM UNDER SECTION 253 OF THE
FTA HAS CAUSED A SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS
There is uncertainty regarding the correct interpretation of
section 253 and the proper standard by which to judge a private
right of action under that section.124 Cases dealing with this
uncertainty can be divided into two categories: those cases which
were decided before Gonzaga and those cases decided after
Gonzaga. Those cases decided pre-Gonzaga were argued on an
implied cause of action theory and held that section 253(c)
allowed for an implied cause of action.125 On the other hand,
those cases decided post-Gonzaga were argued on a section 1983
theory,126 and they held that there was no section 1983 claim
121

See id. at 881–82.
See Samberg-Champion, supra note 14, at 1852.
123
See infra Part III.A.2.
124
See supra Part I.A.
125
See infra Part II.A.
126
Since these post-Gonzaga cases followed the Court’s decision in Gonzaga, it
would not matter if these cases were argued on a section 1983 or an implied cause of
action basis because none of the courts found the creation of a federal right and,
thus, did not reach the part where the claims diverge. See infra Part II.B.
122
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under section 253 of the FTA.127 Yet the fact that the preGonzaga cases were presented as implied causes of action and
those after Gonzaga as a section 1983 claim is pure
happenstance.128
A.

Pre-Gonzaga—Section 253(c) of the FTA Confers an Implied
Cause of Action.

These pre-Gonzaga courts held that there was an implied
cause of action under section 253(c) of the FTA when a state or
local government exceeded its safe harbor to manage or seek
compensation for the use of a public right-of-way.129 They
reached this conclusion by looking to the purpose behind the FTA
as a whole, the text and structure of section 253, that section’s
legislative history, and, by analogy, to other relevant sections of
the FTA.130 Thereafter, they held that those sources indicated
that the telecommunications providers were “ ‘one of the class for
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,’ ”131 and that
there was evidence of legislative intent to create a private
remedy.132 Thus, the telecommunications providers satisfied the
first two factors of the Cort analysis. Moreover, these courts held
that the telecommunications providers satisfied the remaining
two Cort factors.133 That is, an implied cause of action was
consistent with the underlying legislative scheme, and the cause
of action was not one traditionally relegated to the states.134
First, these courts held that the text and structure of section
253 indicated an implied cause of action under section 253(c).135
They noted that although subsection (d) grants the FCC
enforcement over subsections (a) and (b), it does not explicitly do

127

See infra Part II.B.
After all, prior to Gonzaga, it was clear that the section 1983 factors were
less stringent. See Furtick v. Medford Hous. Auth., 963 F. Supp. 64, 71 n.18 (D.
Mass. 1997).
129
See BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169, 1189
(11th Cir. 2001); TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2000).
130
See, e.g., TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 623–24.
131
BellSouth Telecomms., 252 F.3d at 1189 n.12 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66, 78 (1975)).
132
See, e.g., TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 624.
133
See, e.g., id. at 623.
134
See, e.g., id. at 624.
135
See, e.g., id.
128
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so for subsection (c).136 Therefore, these courts held that the FCC
does not have enforcement power over subsection (c) when a state
exceeded its safe harbor to manage a public right-of-way.137
Thus, there must be an implied cause of action under section
253(c) because, if there is not, then no one could enforce the
limits of that safe harbor.138 Therefore, there is both textual and
structural support for an implied cause of action under section
253(c).
Second, the courts found further support for an implied
cause of action after consulting other parts of the FTA.139 They
noted that section 255 expressly foreclosed any private right of
action under that section.140 These courts concluded that when
Congress wanted to foreclose an implied cause of action under
the FTA, they did so explicitly.141 Since Congress did not
expressly exclude a private right of action under section 253, this
silence demonstrated congressional intent to allow for implied
causes of action where a state or local government exceeded its
safe harbor to regulate public rights-of-way.142
Nevertheless, these courts acknowledged that other parts of
the FTA are explicit when they allow for private rights of
action.143 Specifically, they noted that sections 252, 258, and 274
all explicitly allow for a private right of action.144 These courts
held that these provisions allow for remedies “over and above
[the] procedures or remedies available from the [FCC]”145 and do
not apply to ordinary private rights of action.146 Therefore, the
FTA only explicitly grants implied causes of action when it
provides remedies in addition to enforcement by the FCC. Since

136

See BellSouth Telecomms., 252 F.3d at 1189; TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 623.
See BellSouth Telecomms., 252 F.3d at 1189; TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 623.
138
See BellSouth Telecomms., 252 F.3d at 1191; TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 624.
139
See TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 624; see also Stevens, supra note 27 (“ ‘Read the
entire statute.’ ”).
140
See TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 624.
141
See id.
142
See id.
143
See id.
144
See id.
145
Id.
146
See id.
137
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the FCC does not have enforcement power over subsection (c),147
sections 252, 258, and 274 are of no guidance.148
Third, these courts found further evidence for an implied
cause of action by consulting legislative history.149 Specifically,
they looked to Senator Slade Gorton’s statements during the
Senate debate on subsection (d).150 First, Senator Gorton noted
that, even if his amendment was not passed, the FCC did not
have enforcement power under subsection (c).151 He stated,
however, that his amendment would stand for the proposition
“that any challenge [under subsection (c)] take place in the
Federal district court in that locality and that the Federal
Communications Commission not be able to preempt such
actions.”152 Thus, by explicitly noting that any challenge must
take place in federal court and that the FCC does not have
jurisdiction, the intended remedy must be a private right of
action.153 If not, then there would be no way to enforce the
confines of the safe harbor.
Thus, these courts held that the telecommunications
providers had satisfied the Cort factors and granted them an
implied cause of action under section 253(c).154 On the most
important factors, those focusing on legislative intent, these
courts concluded that the telecommunications providers had
shown they were one in a class of protected beneficiaries, and
that Congress sought to create a remedy for them under
subsection (c) of the FTA.155 Moreover, they went on to hold that
the telecommunications providers satisfied the remaining two

147

See id.
See id.
149
See BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169, 1189–
91 (11th Cir. 2001); TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 623.
150
See BellSouth Telecomms., 252 F.3d at 1190–91; TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at
623.
151
See 141 CONG. REC. S8213 (daily ed. June 13, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Gorton) (“There is no preemption . . . for subsection (c).”); TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at
623.
152
See TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 977 F. Supp. 836, 840 (E.D. Mich. 1997)
(quoting 141 CONG. REC. S8213 (statement of Sen. Gorton)).
153
See BellSouth Telecomms., 252 F.3d at 1191; TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 624.
154
See, e.g., TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 623.
155
See id. at 623–24.
148
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Cort factors.156 Therefore, these courts allowed for an implied
cause of action under section 253(c).
B.

Post-Gonzaga—Section 1983 Is Not Enforceable Under
Section 253 of the FTA

After determining that the Gonzaga decision controls, these
courts held that a section 1983 claim cannot be commenced under
section 253 of the FTA.157 In reaching this conclusion, these
courts first asked “ ‘whether Congress intended to create a federal
right.’ ”158 The answer to that turned on “ ‘whether or not
Congress intended to confer individual rights upon a class of
beneficiaries.’ ”159 And that was “answered in the negative where
a statute ‘grants no private rights to any identifiable class.’ ”160
These courts held that the focus of section 253’s language
was on prohibiting state and local activities, not on granting
rights to telecommunications providers.161 That is, the language
of subsection (a) is couched entirely in terms of a prohibition on
state conduct.162 Moreover, although the safe harbors do, in some
manner, grant benefits, these benefits are directed at the state
and local governments.163 There are, however, no benefits
Therefore,
directed at the telecommunications providers.164
Congress did not intend to create a federal right and to confer
such right on telecommunications companies.
Furthermore, these courts rejected the notion that the
absence of subsection (c) in the language of subsection (d) is

156

See, e.g., id. at 623.
See Sw. Bell Tel., LP v. City of Houston, 529 F.3d 257, 260–61 (5th Cir. 2008);
NextG Networks of N.Y., Inc. v. City of New York, 513 F.3d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 2008);
Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258, 1265 (10th Cir. 2004).
158
Sw. Bell Tel., 529 F.3d at 260 (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273,
283 (2002)).
159
NextG Networks of N.Y., 513 F.3d at 52 (quoting Gonzaga, 535 U.S. at 285).
160
City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d at 1265 (quoting Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284). But
even if there was a private right, and, thus, a presumption that there was a remedy,
this presumption is overcome by the presence of a comprehensive enforcement
scheme.
161
See Sw. Bell Tel., 529 F.3d at 261; NextG Networks of N.Y., 513 F.3d at 53;
City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d at 1265.
162
See 47 U.S.C. § 253 (2006).
163
See id. § 253 (b)–(c).
164
Sw. Bell Tel., 529 F.3d at 262.
157
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indicative of legislative intent to provide for a section 1983
claim.165 This was rejected,166 in part, because it would defeat the
overriding purpose of the FTA, which is to “regulate interstate
and foreign commerce and provide safe and efficient services, to
be executed and enforced by the FCC.”167 Moreover, these courts
held that granting a private right of action based on this absence
was the product of a misunderstanding of the legislative history
behind section 253.168 These courts argued that Senator Gorton’s
statements should not be interpreted to allow for section 1983
claims.169 Rather, his statements concerned where the federal
government may bring a preemption challenge against a state for
a violation of section 253.170 As such, the Senator’s statements in
no way reflect intent to allow for a private right of action.171 This
is evidenced by his use of the word “preemption” and not “private

right of action.”172 Therefore, these courts held that the FCC
must have exclusive control over violations of subsection (c), even
though it is not explicitly mentioned in the text of section 253.173
Moreover, at least one court rejected the notion that the FTA
is always explicit when it wants to prevent a section 1983
claim.174 While this court noted that section 255 explicitly denies
a private right of action, it further noted that section 274
explicitly creates a private right of action.175 Therefore, the court
argued, it is improper to conclude that silence in subsection (c)
165

See id.; City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d at 1265–66.
See, e.g., id. at 262.
167
Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. City of Greensboro, 440 F. Supp. 2d 480, 490
(M.D.N.C. 2006) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006)).
168
See id.; City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d at 1266.
169
See, e.g., City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d at 1266.
170
See, e.g., id.
171
See, e.g., id.
172
See, e.g., id.
173
See, e.g., id. As such, these courts held that even if the telecommunications
companies were given a private right, Congress rebutted the presumption of a
private remedy. For example, if the FCC has authority over subsection (c), then it
has authority over the entirety of section 253. If this is the case, then there is a
comprehensive enforcement scheme. As such, the presumption of a private remedy is
negated because Congress has impliedly foreclosed a private remedy by creating a
statutory remedy.
174
See id.
175
See id.
166
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allows for a section 1983 claim because when the FTA creates a
private right of action, it does so explicitly.176 Based on this
evidence, these courts held that Congress did not intend to confer
a right on telecommunications companies under section 253 of
the FTA.177 Therefore, since Congress did not intend to confer a
right on telecommunications companies, they could not sustain a
section 1983 claim under any part of section 253.
III. WHEN FACED WITH A SECTION 1983 OR AN IMPLIED CAUSE OF
ACTION CLAIM UNDER SECTION 253 OF THE FTA, COURTS SHOULD
NOT CONSIDER GONZAGA CONTROLLING PRECEDENT
The pre-Gonzaga courts correctly applied the Cort factors,
and concluded that there was an implied cause of action under
section 253(c) of the FTA for three reasons.178 First, it was
erroneous for the post-Gonzaga courts to hold that Gonzaga was
controlling because that case should be limited to legislation
passed pursuant to Congress’s power to spend under Article I,
Section 8, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution. Since the
FTA was passed pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause,179
Gonzaga is not controlling.180 Second, since the pre-Gonzaga
courts correctly concluded that there was an implied cause of
action, which is the more stringent standard, then those courts
should also permit a section 1983 claim under section 253(c) of
the FTA. Third, private rights of action are justified under
section 253(c) because they advance significant policy goals. For
these reasons, the courts should allow for an implied cause of
action and a section 1983 claim where a state or local
government exceeds its safe harbor to manage a public right-ofway under section 253(c) of the FTA.
A.

The Gonzaga Decision Should Be Limited to Spending
Clause Cases

The Court has a long history of skepticism when dealing
with private right of action claims brought under Spending

176
177
178
179
180

See id. at 1266–67.
See, e.g., id.
See supra Part II.A.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
See infra Part III.B.
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Clause legislation because of its contractual nature and the
availability of other remedies.181
For example, the Court
attempts to preserve the reasonable expectations of the state and
federal government.182 Thus, a claimant that brings a private
right of action under Spending Clause legislation shares the
same attenuated status as a third-party beneficiary.183 On
another note, the typical remedy under Spending Clause
legislation for state noncompliance is for the federal government
to withhold funds, not enforcement via a private right of action.184
For these reasons, it is common for courts to spurn private rights
of actions under Spending Clause legislation.
1.

Spending Clause Legislation Is Unique Because of Its
Contractual Nature

The Court is often reluctant to grant a private right of action
under Spending Clause legislation because it would alter the
reasonable expectations of the state and federal government.
The arrangement between the state and federal government in
Spending Clause legislation is like that of two private parties
engaged in a private contract.185 There is clearly consideration
because both parties are subject to a benefit and a legal
detriment.186 For example, the state receives federal funding, but
in return, must abide by the terms of the legislation.187 Likewise,
the federal government receives a benefit and suffers a legal
detriment.188 That is, the states will advance the federal
government’s policy—the benefit—in exchange for federal
money—the legal detriment.189 Moreover, there is also at least

181

See Samberg-Champion, supra note 14, at 1855–56. In fact, many of the
precedents the Court relied on in Gonzaga are primarily cases in which the
underlying legislation was passed pursuant to the Spending Clause. See id.; see also
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 279–82 (2002) (citing, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981)).
182
See infra Part III.A.1.
183
See infra Part III.A.2.
184
See infra Part III.A.3.
185
Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17.
186
See Blum v. Gen. Elec. Co., 536 F. Supp. 2d 720, 728 (W.D. Tex. 2008)
(“Consideration consists of benefits and detriments to the contracting parties.”).
187
See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17.
188
See id.
189
See id.
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the semblance of a bargain.190 Therefore, even though it appears
that Spending Clause legislation is little more than a contract of
adhesion, with the federal government offering a “take-it-orleave-it” proposition,191 some states do “leave” certain federal
funding.192 But when the states do “take” the money, the Court
wants to make sure the states are informed of the conditions.193
Thus, if Congress wants to allow for private rights of action in
legislation passed pursuant to its spending power, it must do so
explicitly.194 If courts later allow a plaintiff to bring a private
right of action claim under such legislation, then the court has
effectively “alter[ed] the terms of [the] contract[ ] between [the]
state[ ] and the federal government.”195 Such a result, however,
would be inconsistent with contract theory because it would not
mirror the reasonable expectations of the parties at the time of
the bargain.196
2.

Private Right of Action Claimants in Spending Clause
Legislation Are Akin to Third-Party Beneficiaries

The Court in Gonzaga limited private rights of action under
Spending Clause legislation by treating claimants as third-party

190

See id.
Compare id. (finding that Spending Clause legislation is in the nature of a
contract), and United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 71 (1936) (holding that it is an
unconstitutional exercise under the Spending Clause if the legislation is tantamount
to coercion by the federal government), and Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079,
1082 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that the legislation passed pursuant to the Spending
Clause was not coercive because it presented a “take-it-or-leave-it” opportunity to
the states), with IAN AYERS & RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 575
(7th ed. 2008) (“Standard form contracts presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis are
often referred to as ‘contracts of adhesion.’ ”). But see Peter J. Smith, Pennhurst,
Chevron, and the Spending Power, 110 YALE L.J. 1187, 1239 n.197 (2001) (doubting
that Spending Clause legislation is invalid as a contract of adhesion).
192
See, e.g., Jennifer Medina, New York Just Says No to Abstinence Funding,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2007, at B3.
193
See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280 (2002). This is very similar to
what courts consider when determining if a contract is unconscionable. See Williams
v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding that
one relevant question in determining whether a contract is unconscionable is
whether the party had “a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the
contract, or were the important terms hidden.”).
194
See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280.
195
Samberg-Champion, supra note 14, at 1875.
196
ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 2 (Joseph M. Perillo ed.,
Yale University rev. ed. 1993).
191
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beneficiaries. That is, if the state is akin to a promissor and the
federal government is akin to the promisee, then it stands to
reason that a claimant bringing a private right of action claim
pursuant to Spending Clause legislation is, at best, a third-party
beneficiary.197 Under contract theory, however, not all thirdparty beneficiaries enjoy enforceable rights under a contract.198
Rather, a third-party beneficiary must have a legally protected
interest in the contractual relationship in order to have a claim
under the contract.199 Thus, the Court in Gonzaga treats
claimants in a private right of action as third-party beneficiaries:
that is, not automatically bestowed enforceable rights. As such,
not every claimant will have a legally protected interest in the
“contract” between the state and the federal government.
Therefore, the Court is only willing to create a private right of
action when “Congress intended to confer individual rights upon
a class of beneficiaries.”200 Thus, the Gonzaga decision was an
attempt to reign in the rights of third-party beneficiaries to
Spending Clause legislation: that is, claimants seeking to enforce
Spending Clause legislation via a private right of action. For all
that, this contractual analogy is unique to Spending Clause
legislation. Therefore, if the underlying legislation is not passed
pursuant to the Spending Clause, the standard developed in
Gonzaga for third-party beneficiaries should not be applied.
3. Termination of Funds Is the Preferred Enforcement
Mechanism
Another reason to limit the Gonzaga decision is due to an
inherent and preferred enforcement mechanism in all Spending
Clause legislation. The Court held in Gonzaga that there must
be evidence of both an intention to create a private right and a

197

See Samberg-Champion, supra note 14, at 1852–53.
See FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 119.
199
See id.
200
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002) (emphasis added). Although
under the implied cause of action theory, the courts have always weighed heavily on
the presence of or absence of legislative intent, see supra notes 87–93 and
accompanying text, the Gonzaga court wanted the same treatment for third-party
beneficiaries proceeding under section 1983. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280.
198
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private remedy.201 But as the Court notes, “ ‘[i]n legislation
enacted pursuant to [Congress’s] spending power, the typical
remedy for state noncompliance with federally imposed
conditions is not a private cause of action for noncompliance but
rather action by the Federal Government to terminate funds to
the State.’ ”202 Thus, in all Spending Clause legislation, there is
arguably evidence that Congress has “ ‘specifically foreclosed a
remedy.’ ”203 If the underlying remedy in Spending Clause
legislation is for the federal government to withhold funding, it
follows that there is no private remedy. Thus, it is easy to
understand why the Court has only twice in twenty-seven years
found a section 1983 action where the underlying legislation was
passed pursuant to Congress’s power to spend.204 But legislation
that is not passed pursuant to the Spending Clause will not
always have a comprehensive enforcement scheme. As such, it
does not make sense to expand the Gonzaga decision outside of
Spending Clause legislation.
B.

The FTA Was Not Passed Pursuant to the Spending Clause

Since the FTA was passed pursuant to Congress’s power to
regulate interstate commerce, and not pursuant to the Spending
Clause, the Gonzaga decision should not apply to section 253 of
the FTA.205 Many of the concerns involving private rights of
action under Spending Clause legislation are simply not present
where the underlying legislation is passed pursuant to
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. For example,
there is no contractual relationship between the state and the

201
Id. at 284–85. For example, with regards to implied causes of action, the
plaintiff must show that Congress intended to create a private remedy. See
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001). Likewise, although the plaintiff in
a section 1983 claim is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that a private remedy is
created, the presumption is rebutted if the state can show that Congress foreclosed
that remedial avenue. See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1004 & n.9 (1984).
202
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981)).
203
Id. at 284 n.4 (quoting Smith, 468 U.S. at 1004 n.9).
204
Samberg-Champion, supra note 14, at 1875.
205
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power to regulate
commerce among the states); 47 U.S.C. § 253 (2006) (prohibiting states from
interfering with interstate telecommunications providers).
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federal government.206
Rather, states do not have the
opportunity to opt-out of legislation passed pursuant to the
Commerce Clause.207 As such, there is no bargain or legal
detriment to the federal government. If there is no bargain or
legal determinant, then there is an absence of a relationship akin
to a contract.208 Therefore, the courts are not concerned with
altering the reasonable expectations of the parties. Moreover,
since there is no contractual relationship, a private right of
action claimant is not akin to a third party. Thus, contractual
analogy does not prevent these claimants from seeking
enforcement.
Additionally, unlike Spending Clause legislation, there is no
inherent enforcement scheme in Commerce Clause legislation.209
It is true that the FCC does act as an enforcement mechanism in
the FTA, and, thus, Congress must have considered at least a
partial enforcement mechanism.210 Yet, unlike withholding funds
in Spending Clause legislation, the FCC is not an overriding
enforcement mechanism.211 This is why the circuit courts had to
engage in in-depth statutory analysis to determine the reach of
the FCC under subsection (d).212 At least some of the courts held
that the FCC did not even enforce all of section 253.213 Therefore,
an overriding enforcement mechanism is absent from the FTA.
Thus, the post-Gonzaga courts should not have applied the
Gonzaga standard. Instead, they should have followed the lead
of the pre-Gonzaga courts and applied the Cort factors.
206

See Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States (Shreveport Rate Case), 234
U.S. 342, 351 (1914) (holding that when Congress has legislated in interstate
commerce, that legislation dominates).
207
See id. at 351–52.
208
See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)
(noting that in Spending Clause legislation, there is a relationship akin to a
contract).
209
Compare Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1004–05 (1984) (noting that in
Spending Clause litigation, the typical remedy is to withhold the money), with, e.g.,
Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388, 409 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding that the appropriate
remedy under this Commerce Clause legislation was an injunction of the offending
statute).
210
See 47 U.S.C. § 253(d).
211
See TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2000)
(finding that section 253(c) is not subject to enforcement by the FCC but, rather, by
an implied cause of action).
212
See, e.g., id. at 623.
213
See id. at 624.
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The Cort Factors Mandate a Private Right of Action

Since Gonzaga is not controlling, the correct approach is to
apply the Cort factors to see if there is an implied cause of action
under section 253 of the FTA. The Cort factors may be
summarized as follows: (1) “[I]s the plaintiff ‘one of the class for
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted[?]’ ”214 (2) “[I]s
there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit,
either to create such a remedy or to deny one?”215 (3) “[I]s it
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme
to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?”216 (4) “[I]s the cause of
action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area
basically the concern of the States, so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal
law?”217 Still, emphasis should be placed on factors one and
two—those factors pertaining to legislative intent.218
Under the first Cort factor, it is clear that the FTA was
passed to benefit telecommunications providers. As stated in the
preamble to the FTA, the goal of Congress was to reduce
regulation and increase competition.219
This benefited
telecommunications providers in two ways: existing providers
were no longer burdened by stringent regulations220 and potential
telecommunications providers were no longer excluded from the
market.221
Moreover, section 253 of the FTA itself demonstrates that
Congress intended to benefit telecommunications providers. For
example, subsection (a) provides that “any entity” is to be free
from attempts by state or local governments to interrupt or
interfere with their services.222 Further, although subsection (c)

214
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (quoting Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby,
241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)).
215
Id.
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
219
See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, Preamble, 110
Stat. 56, 56.
220
See id. (stating that one goal was deregulation).
221
See id. (stating that one goal was to increase competition).
222
See 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2006); see also Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 36,
Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 02-2258, 022269).
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creates a safe harbor for state and local governments,223 it still
operates within a right of the telecommunications provider.224
That is, even though section 253(c) is a safe harbor for
governmental activity, once the government operates outside
that safe harbor, it is interfering with the rights granted to
telecommunications providers. Therefore, even within the safe
harbor of subsection (c), Congress still intended to protect the
telecommunications providers.225
Under the second Cort factor, it is clear that Congress
intended to create a private remedy under section 253(c). Section
253(c) supports an implied cause of action because subsection (c)
is notably absent from the “enforcement provision” of section
253.226 This indicates that Congress did not want the FCC to
have enforcement power over subsection (c).227 It does not make
sense to argue that the FCC does not have enforcement power
and that telecommunications providers have no private right of
action. Although one can assume that certain statutes are to be
under-enforced,228 such a reading would result in almost no
enforcement when a state or local government exceeded its safe
harbor under subsection (c).229 For example, a state or local
government could simply flaunt the law and say that their
activity was within subsection (c)—the management of a right-ofway. But if the FCC does not have jurisdiction and there is no
private right of action, then no one could determine whether they
exceeded the scope of the safe harbor. Therefore, since Congress

223

See Sw. Bell Tel., LP v. City of Houston, 529 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2008).
See BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169, 1187
(11th Cir. 2001) (stating that subsection (a) confers the substantive right and (b) and
(c) act as safe-harbors).
225
See Cablevision of Boston, Inc. v. Pub. Improvement Comm’n, 38 F. Supp. 2d
46, 56 (D. Mass. 1999).
226
47 U.S.C. § 253(d).
227
See TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2000).
228
See Samberg-Champion, supra note 14, at 1859–62.
229
It appears that the only possible enforcement would be implied cause of
action cases by consumers. 47 U.S.C. § 207 (2006). But this seems to be the very
attenuated type of suits that concerned the Court in Gonzaga. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe,
536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002); Samberg-Champion, supra note 14, at 1878–81. Therefore,
it is likely that a post-Gonzaga court would reject this claim, even though the FTA is
not passed pursuant to the Spending Clause. A suit by telecommunications
providers, however, would not be attenuated and, thus would not raise such
concerns.
224
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specifically foreclosed FCC enforcement, there must be an
implied cause of action for telecommunications providers.
Furthermore, since the FTA is always explicit when it
prohibits an implied cause of action, silence in section 253 should
be understood as approval of such claims.230 For example, the
language of section 255 clearly prohibits a private right of
action.231 There is, however, no prohibitive language in section
253.232 Although certain other provisions of the FTA are explicit
when they allow for implied causes of action, this only occurs
when Congress wants to allow for suits “over and above” the
FCC.233 For instance, section 258 allows for a private right of
action if a telecommunication provider is dissatisfied with an
FCC ruling regarding that section.234 Since there is no FCC
enforcement of subsection (c), these other sections are
unpersuasive.
Likewise, the legislative history indicates that Congress
intended to create a private remedy under section 253(c) for
telecommunications providers.235 For example, Senator Gorton
noted that subsection (c) was noticeably absent from subsection
(d); thus, the FCC could not enforce subsection (c).236 Moreover,
the Senator contemplated that suits would take place outside of
the FCC, and that such cases should be held in district courts.237
Although it is plausible that the Senator was simply referring to
preemption claims,238 this alone, even under the strictest
interpretation of the Cort factors, is not enough to overcome the
overwhelming evidence in favor of an implied cause of action.239
The third Cort factor is satisfied because a private right of
action is consistent with the underlying legislative purposes of
the FTA. The preamble states that the FTA was passed “[t]o

230

See TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 624.
See 47 U.S.C. § 255 (2006).
232
See id.
233
See TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 624.
234
See 47 U.S.C. § 258 (2006).
235
See Stevens, supra note 27, at 1381 (“[C]onsult the legislative history.”).
236
See 141 CONG. REC. S8213 (daily ed. June 13, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Gorton).
237
See id.
238
See Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258, 1266 (10th Cir. 2004).
239
See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979) (stating that the Cort
factors are used only to judge legislative intent).
231
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promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure
lower prices and higher quality services for . . . consumers.”240 In
other words, the purpose of the legislation was to promote
competition in the telecommunications market in the hopes of
ultimately providing higher quality service to consumers at a
lower cost.241 There is no reason why an implied cause of action
would be inconsistent with this end. Although at times Congress
did intend for enforcement to be done solely by the FCC, at
others it was content to allow for enforcement by other means.242
For example, Congress deliberately excluded from the language
of subsection (d) any mention that the FCC should have
enforcement power over subsection (c). If Congress wanted the
FCC to have sole jurisdiction, it would have included subsection
(c) within the language of (d).243 Such a reading is supported by
Senator Gorton’s statements in which he notes that subsection (c)
is being deliberately omitted from subsection (d).244 Moreover,
the FTA is always explicit when it wants to prohibit an implied
cause of action.245 Therefore, when Congress thought that an
implied cause of action was inconsistent with the FTA, such suits
were prohibited. Yet Congress does not explicitly prohibit an
implied cause of action in section 253.246 Thus, the legislative
history and the text and structure of section 253 demonstrate
that an implied cause of action would not hamper the underlying
purpose of the FTA.
The fourth Cort factor is satisfied because the cause of action
is not “one traditionally relegated to state law.”247 The FTA was
passed pursuant to Congress’s power to regulate interstate
commerce.248 Interstate commerce is not an area traditionally
regulated by the states.249 Rather, the whole point of the

240

Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, Preamble, 110 Stat.

56, 56.
241

See id.
See TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2000).
243
See id. at 624.
244
See 141 CONG. REC. S8213 (daily ed. June 13, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Gorton).
245
See TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 624.
246
See 47 U.S.C. § 253(c) (2006).
247
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
248
See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
249
See generally, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197–200 (1824).
242
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Commerce Clause was to prevent the states from interfering with
goods shipped in interstate commerce.250 Thus, section 253
explicitly prohibits states from disrupting the “ability of any
entity to provide . . . telecommunications service”251 unless such
state activity falls within one of the safe harbors.252 Therefore,
the activities governed by section 253 are clearly not those
activities normally left to the state, and, thus, the fourth Cort
factor is undoubtedly satisfied.
Accordingly, the Cort factors allow for a private action under
section 253(c) of the FTA. The text and structure of section 253,
along with the FTA as a whole and section 253’s legislative
history all lend credence to this claim. They indicate that section
253 is not generally regulated by the states and that an implied
cause of action is consistent with the underlying purpose of the
FTA. More importantly, however, they indicate that Congress
intended to create an implied cause of action for the
telecommunications carriers.
Since an implied cause of action claim would succeed under
section 253(c) of the FTA, it stands to reason that a section 1983
claim would also succeed. This result follows because the Cort
factors are considered to be more stringent than the factors
governing section 1983 claims.253 Therefore, any court that
allows an implied cause of action will also allow for a section
1983 claim.
D. Policy Reasons Support a Private Right of Action
Although subsections (a) and (b) of section 253 of the FTA
are enforced by the FCC, this agency does not have enforcement

250

See Island Silver & Spice, Inc. v. Islamorada, Village of Islands, 475 F. Supp.
2d 1281, 1289 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (“ ‘[I]n order to succeed, the new Union would have to
avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations
among . . . the States under the Articles of Confederation.’ ” (quoting Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979))). Moreover, under the dormant commerce
clause, the Court has held that states cannot regulate interstate commerce, even if
Congress has yet to legislate in that area. See Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Jim’s
Motorcycle, Inc., 401 F.3d 560, 567 (4th Cir. 2005).
251
47 U.S.C. § 253(a).
252
See BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169, 1187
(11th Cir. 2001).
253
Furtick v. Medford Hous. Auth., 963 F. Supp. 64, 71 n.18 (D. Mass. 1997).
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power over subsection (c).254 If the FCC does not enforce the
limits of the safe harbor for state and local governments to
manage a public right-of-way, and there is no private right of
action, then a state or local government can abuse this safe
harbor provision. For example, even though subsection (a)
prohibits a state or local government from interfering with
telecommunication services, a state or local government could
manage a public right-of-way in discriminatory way. Although
this is prohibited under subsection (c),255 the FCC would not have
enforcement power over that subsection.256 Moreover, even
though such action would violate subsection (a) because it
interfered with telecommunications services,257 a state or local
government could escape liability by claiming they were acting
within the confines of subsection (c). Since the FCC does not
have enforcement authority under subsection (c), the FCC would
be powerless to prohibit this activity.258 Allowing a state or local
government to circumvent the law in this way would hamper
Congress’s goal of “end[ing] the monopolies in local telephone
services and . . . benefit[ing] consumers by fostering competition
between telephone companies in cities throughout the United
States.”259 Therefore, a private right of action is needed under
subsection (c) to insure that the overriding purpose of the FTA is
implemented. After all, “[l]aws have little meaning unless they
can be enforced.”260
Another reason to allow private rights of action under
section 253 is to protect the reasonable expectations of the

254

See 47 U.S.C. § 253(d).
See id. § 253(c).
256
See BellSouth Telecomms., 252 F.3d at 1189–91 (holding that “enforcement of
(c) is left to private parties”).
257
See 47 U.S.C. § 253(a).
258
See TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2000).
259
AT&T Commc’ns of the Sw., Inc. v. City of Dallas, 8 F. Supp. 2d 582, 585
(N.D. Tex. 1998).
260
Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 71; see also Response & Reply Brief of
Plaintiff-Appellant at 31, Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P. v. Cnty. of San Diego, 543 F.3d
571 (9th Cir. 2006) (Nos. 05-56076 (L), 05-56435) (stating that without a private
right of action the local government had, for four years, “steadfastly refuse[d] to
abide by [s]ection 253’s proscriptions”).
255
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parties.261 Undoubtedly, telecommunications companies make
huge investments when they install equipment to provide
telecommunications services.262 Although telecommunications
providers expect to pay reasonable compensation for the use of
public right-of-ways, they do not expect state or local
governments to charge discriminatory or unreasonable fees in
violation of federal law.263
Moreover, if they did charge
discriminatory fees, a telecommunications provider would expect
a legal remedy.264 Furthermore, it is unreasonable for state or
local governments to expect that they could openly flaunt federal
law.265 Therefore, since the FCC does not have enforcement
power over subsection (c), a private right of action protects the
reasonable expectations of the telecommunications providers and
state and local governments by enforcing the limits of the safe
harbor in subsection (c).
Finally, a private right of action for telecommunications
companies under section 253 does not present “a special risk of
vexatious litigation”266 that would “swell[ ] our already
overburdened federal court system beyond capacity.”267 The
primary purpose of a corporation is to maximize profits.268
Therefore,
Litigation, however, is costly and inefficient.269
corporations often settle lawsuits even if they will prevail at

261
See Stabile, supra note 12, at 908 (stating that one policy reason for not
enforcing an implied cause of action is where it will disrupt the reasonable
expectations of the parties).
262
See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 34, Cablevision of Boston v. Pub.
Improvement Comm’n, 184 F.3d 88 (1st Cir. 1999) (No. 99-1222) (stating that the
telecommunications provider had invested millions in infrastructure in order to
provide services).
263
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 253(c) (2006).
264
See generally, e.g., TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618 (6th Cir.
2000).
265
And “if the law supposes that . . . the law is a ass—a idiot.” CHARLES
DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 394 (Everyman Library ed., 1940).
266
See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 86
(2006).
267
See Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1985).
268
See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962).
269
See Alexandra Anne Hui, Note, Equitable Estoppel and the Compulsion of
Arbitration, 60 VAND. L. REV. 711, 717 (2007).

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 657 (2010)

692

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:657

trial.270 Thus, it is extremely unlikely that corporations will
commence a private right of action under section 253 merely to
annoy state or local governments. Instead, a corporation is likely
to screen out the less-than-meritorious claims and only bring suit
when there is substantial evidence that section 253 was violated.
Therefore, most private rights of action brought under section
253 by a telecommunications provider will be worthy of a court’s
time and consideration.
IV. CONCLUSION
Telecommunications providers must have access to the
courts under section 253 because only then will Congress’s goal
be achieved—deregulation which leads to lower costs and higher
quality to consumers. To apply the Gonzaga decision to this area
of the law would effectively eliminate Congress’s purpose in
passing section 253 of the FTA. Thus, courts should allow for a
private right of action under section 253 for three reasons. First,
the Gonzaga decision should be limited only to Spending Clause
legislation. Such a result is justified by the availability of other
remedies and the unique relationship between all parties to
Spending Clause legislation. Second, if the Gonzaga decision is
not applied, the Cort factors should be applied, and the Cort
factors mandate an implied cause of action under section 253(c)
of the FTA. Since the Cort factors mandate an implied cause of
action, the less stringent section 1983 claim must also be
allowed. Third, several important policy reasons dictate that
there should be a private right of action under section 253(c) of
the FTA. Therefore, the pre-Gonzaga courts correctly applied the
law by allowing a private right of action.

270
Cf. CHARLES R.T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 367–68 (5th ed. 2006) (stating that directors will
only bring litigation when it is in the corporations best interest).

